Reinstatement Held as an Option for Debtors Who File for Chapter 7 by Middendorf, Lynn
Loyola Consumer Law Review
Volume 10 | Issue 1 Article 9
1998
Reinstatement Held as an Option for Debtors
Who File for Chapter 7
Lynn Middendorf
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
This Recent Case is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law Review
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lynn Middendorf Reinstatement Held as an Option for Debtors Who File for Chapter 7, 10 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 38 (1998).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol10/iss1/9
Reinstatement Held as an Option for Debtors Who
File for Chapter 7
By Lynn Middendorf
In Capital Communications
Federal Credit Union v. Boodrow,
126 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 1997), the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that a debtor
who has filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter 7 may retain possession of
the collateral for a loan and continue
to make loan payments under the loan
agreement as long as the debtor
remains current on his payments.
Presented with a case of first
impression, the court found that the
debtor's retention of collateral,
without redemption or reaffirmation,
does not violate 11 U.S.C. § 521(2).
A debtor who files for bankruptcy
has three options under § 521(2)
regarding debts secured by personal
property. First, a debtor may "surren-
der," or return his collateral to a
creditor. Second, he may "redeem:'
or keep the collateral by paying the
creditor for the property. Finally, he
may "reaffirm" his financing agree-
ment with the creditor by entering
into a new loan arrangement, even an
agreement potentially containing new
terms.
In the present case, Brian
Boodrow ("Boodrow") had secured a
car loan from Capital Communica-
tions Federal Credit Union ("Capi-
tal"), for $15,900 to pay for a 1992
Pontiac Grand Am. In May 1995,
Boodrow filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter 7 of the Code. When
Boodrow filed for bankruptcy, the
amount outstanding on the loan was
$8,820 and the car's market value
was $9,650.
After submitting his bankruptcy
petition, Boodrow indicated that he
intended to keep his car and reaffirm
his debt with Capital by filing a
statement of intention as required by
11 U.S.C. § 521(2). When Boodrow
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determined, however, that he could
not return to work full-time because
of a permanent disability, he did not
reaffirm his loan agreement with
Capital. Instead, he simply kept the
car, retained the proper insurance,
and stayed current on his monthly
loan payments.
In July 1995, Capital filed a
motion to lift Boodrow's automatic
stay and for other relief on the
grounds that Boodrow had failed to
follow the requirements of § 521(2).
Capital argued that Boodrow had to
turn the car over, pay the entire
market value of the car, or reaffirm
his debt under § 521(2), and that
Boodrow's failure to comply with
§ 521(2) constituted "cause" to lift
the automatic stay.
In August 1995, the bankruptcy
court heard Capital's motion but
reserved its decision. In September
1995, the court discharged Boodrow
from bankruptcy. Then in December,
the court denied Capital's motion to
lift Boodrow's automatic stay. The
bankruptcy court held that Capital
had not shown sufficient cause to lift
the stay because § 521(2) permits a
debtor to keep his collateral and
continue payments according to the
loan agreement. In addition, the court
held that Capital had not shown that
it would be harmed if the stay
remained in place. Capital appealed
and both the district court and the
Second Circuit affirmed the bank-
ruptcy court's decision.
Discharge of Bankruptcy Does Not
Necessarily Make a Case Moot
The Second Circuit first addressed
whether the case was moot since
Boodrow's discharge from bank-
ruptcy occurred before a decision was
reached on Capital's motion to lift
the automatic stay. The court
discussed two main issues. The first
issue was whether the automatic stay
dissolved as a result of Boodrow's
discharge from bankruptcy. Under 11
U.S.C. § 362(c)(1), "the stay of an
act against property of the estate...
continues until such property is no
longer property of the estate." In
other words, an automatic stay will
not terminate merely upon a debtor's
discharge from bankruptcy. The court
held that the stay did not dissolve at
discharge because Boodrow still
retained the car after September
1995.
The second issue the court
addressed was whether the court
remained able to grant any relief to
Capital even after Boodrow's
discharge from bankruptcy. Accord-
ing to the U.S. Supreme Court, a case
is moot only if the court ofjurisdic-
tion can no longer grant any relief to
the injured party. The court reasoned
that Capital was seeking a lift of the
automatic stay either to recover the
vehicle or benefit from proceeds of
comparable monetary value. There-
fore, because the bankruptcy court
granted Boodrow the discharge while
he retained possession of the vehicle,
the court essentially perpetuated the
alleged harm that Capital was seeking
to avoid in its motion to lift the stay.
The Second Circuit held that it could
grant Capital the relief it sought if it
agreed with Capital's interpretation
of § 521(2). For example, the court
could remand the case back to the
bankruptcy court and order Boodrow
to comply with § 521(2). After
remand, Capital could still receive
monetary compensation at the value
of Boodrow's outstanding loan or
simply repossess the vehicle. Because
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Capital could still attain relief, the
court held that the case was not moot.
Court Offers a Broad Interpretation
In examining the merits of the
case, the Second Circuit explained
that a bankruptcy court can lift an
automatic stay if the movant shows
cause. Capital argued that, pursuant
to § 362(d)(1), it had shown cause
that the stay should be lifted because
Boodrow failed to comply with §
521(2). Capital asserted that because
Boodrow did not reaffirm his debt,
turn the car over to his creditor, or
pay his creditor the full value of the
car, he did not meet the requirements
of § 521(2). The court acknowledged
that other circuits have held that a
debtor is exclusively limited to the
options specified in § 521(2).
Boodrow responded that he had met
the requirements of § 521(2) by
notifying Capital of his intentions to
keep the car and to continue making
payments under the original loan
agreement, thus, Capital had not
shown cause to lift the stay. The court
noted that other circuits had found
these actions met the requirements of
§ 521(2) and examined several
reasons for finding that Boodrow had
met the requirements of § 521(2),
beginning with the text of the statute.
In interpreting § 521(2), the court
first turned to the text of the statute
which states:
within thirty days after the
date of the filing of a
petition under chapter 7...
the debtor shall file with the
clerk a statement of his
intention with respect to the
retention or surrender of
such property and, if
applicable, specifying that
such property is claimed as
exempt, that the debtor
intends to redeem such
property, or that the debtor
intends to reaffirm debts
secured by such property.
The bankruptcy court and the
district court had held that the
language of the statute did not restrict
Boodrow to those three options. Both
courts looked to the decision of
Home Owners Funding Corp. v.
Belanger, 962 F.2d 345 (4th Cir.
1992), where the Fourth Circuit
examined the phrase "if applicable"
in § 521(2) and determined that such
a phrase implied that the section's
provisions were not exclusive. The
bankruptcy court and the district
court, therefore, permitted Boodrow
to retain his car and continue
payments to the creditor under the
original loan agreement, a procedure
which they called "reinstatement."
Capital, however, argued that the
statute limited debtors only to the
three express options of surrender,
redemption, and reaffirmation.
Capital relied on the Seventh
Circuit's interpretation of "if
applicable" in Taylor v. AGE Federal
Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d
1512 (11 th Cir. 1993). The Seventh
Circuit had held that the statute's "if
applicable" phrase merely distin-
guished the option of "retention or
surrender" from the options of
redemption or reaffirmation; the
phrase, however, did not indicate that
the debtor had other courses of
action.
Moreover, Capital argued that its
interpretation of § 521(2) was more
sensible when § 521 was compared to
other provisions of the statute. Under
§ 521(2)(B), the debtor must take
action regarding the collateral within
45 days after serving his notice of
intention to the creditor. Since
Boodrow could not possibly pay the
entire loan on his vehicle within 45
days after he decided to retain the
property, allowing him to choose
reinstatement conflicts with § 521(2)
as a whole. Lastly, Capital contended
that because there are no other
options provided anywhere else in the
Bankruptcy Code, those listed in §
521(2) are exclusive.
Unable to ascertain Congress'
intent regarding the exclusivity of the
options listed in § 521(2) from the
Code's language, the court turned to
the statute's legislative history.
Congressional subcommittee reports
suggested that the statute was
designed as a notice provision in
order to let the creditor know what
the debtor was planning to do with
the collateral used to secure debts.
The court concluded that, since the
purpose of the statute was to serve
notice, it did not necessarily limit the
options open to a debtor who wanted
to keep the collateral and simply stay
current on his loan. The court also
held that even if the 45 day time limit
in § 521(2) was contrary to the
principle of reinstatement, the statute
was nevertheless a notice provision,
and debtors had a reinstatement
option opened to them. Additionally,
the court noted that a bankruptcy
court has the discretion of extending
the time period beyond 45 days.
The court concluded that the
decisions of the bankruptcy court and
the district court were consistent with
the Code's policy of giving a debtor
who has been discharged from
bankruptcy a "fresh start." The U.S.
Supreme Court has discussed the
fresh start policy for debtors recently
discharged from bankruptcy. Limiting
a debtor to the three options listed in
§ 521(2) would prevent the debtor
from having a fresh start. The Second
Circuit reasoned that a debtor would
probably not have the resources to
redeem the collateral. Therefore, the
debtor, if restricted to the three
options in § 521(2), would either
have to reaffirm the loan agreement or
surrender the collateral. Since
Loyola University Chicago School ofLaw • 391998
reaffirmation involves renewed
negotiations with the creditor, who
frequently possesses greater bargain-
ing power, the creditor would benefit
from a new agreement. In addition, a
debtor opting for surrender may have
to give up important property, that
being a car in this case. Thus,
limiting debtors to the options
provided in § 521(2) might prevent
debtors from having a fresh start after
discharge.
Capital responded that if a
bankruptcy court permitted a debtor
to retain his collateral without
redeeming or reaffirming, a creditor
would run the risk of serious
financial harm. After discharge from
bankruptcy, a debtor is free from
liability on loans. Capital argued that
if a debtor defaulted on a loan after
discharge, a creditor would only be
able to recover the collateral but
would not be able to recovery the
difference between the outstanding
loan balance and the present value of
the property. Capital also argued that
after discharge the debtor, released
from liability to the loan, would have
no motivation to maintain the
condition of the collateral or con-
tinue payments if the value of the
collateral depreciates below the
outstanding loan debt. Additionally,
Capital contended that Boodrow's
reading of § 521(2) essentially
eliminates the reaffirmation option
because no reasonable debtor would
choose to reaffirm a debt and impose
new liability on himself.
The court disagreed with Capital's
arguments. Creditors would not be
harmed substantially by reinstatement
because creditors are entitled to
recover the collateral's value if the
debtor defaults on the loan. Hence,
creditors would not face substantial
harm if the value of the collateral was
greater than the outstanding loan
payments at the time of default. The
court reasoned that a debtor is
motivated to stay current on payments
and maintain the value of the
collateral because a debtor's chance
of obtaining credit for a new, similar
property is hampered by his bank-
ruptcy. For example, Boodrow argued
that he wanted to stay current on his
loan and maintain his car because he
had no way of obtaining another one.
Additionally, the court reasoned that
a debtor may choose to reaffirm his
debt, even when reinstatement is an
option, in order to reestablish credit
or make a new loan agreement that
would help him avoid default and
cure any arrearage he may have had
before filing for bankruptcy.
After examining the language of §
521(2), its legislative history, and the
Code's policies, the court held that a
debtor may retain his collateral and
continue to make payments on a loan
according to a loan's original
agreement if he is current on his loan
payments.
The court also explained that a
bankruptcy court has the discretion to
decide whether a debtor may retain
collateral on a loan and continue
making payments under the loan's
original agreement. A bankruptcy
court would consider the debtor's
past payment history, the difference
between the collateral value and the
outstanding loan amount, and other
pertinent factors. A debtor whose
conduct indicated that he would not
be able to continue making timely
payments would probably not be
protected from the automatic stay.
The court then held that in this case,
the bankruptcy court had not abused
its discretion in denying Capital its
motion to lift the stay. Capital had the
burden of showing that it would
suffer an affirmative harm if the
bankruptcy court did not lift the stay.
However, the court found that there
was no evidence to indicate that
Boodrow would fail to make timely
payments. In addition, Capital had
already conceded that the value of the
collateral substantially outweighed
the outstanding loan balance. Capital
would still be able to recover the full
outstanding loan if Boodrow
defaulted. In other words, Capital had
not shown an affirmative harm that
would result from the bankruptcy
court's decision. Therefore, the
bankruptcy court had not abused its
discretion when it denied Capital's
motion.
Dissent Disagrees with Majority on
Mootness and Interpretation
The dissent disagreed with the
majority on both the mootness issue
and the interpretation of § 521(2).
The dissent first asserted that the case
was moot, even before the bankruptcy
court rendered its decision, and
should have been dismissed. The
dissent also disagreed with the
majority's broad interpretation of §
521(2).
On the issue of mootness, the
dissent reasoned that when Capital
first filed its motion to lift the
automatic stay in July 1995, there
was a live dispute. However, when
the bankruptcy court discharged
Boodrow in September 1995 before
rendering a decision on Capital's
motion, a live dispute on the motion
no longer existed. Under 11 U.S.C. §
362(c)(2)(C), a discharge from
bankruptcy dissolves an automatic
stay by operation of law. The
automatic stay, therefore, lacked any
valid legal existence after Boodrow
was discharged from bankruptcy.
Capital then lost any interest in the
outcome of its motion to lift the stay.
Judge Shadur, the author of the
dissenting opinion, first responded to
the majority's conclusion that
Boodrow's case was still opened after
discharge because he retained the
collateral. The dissent explained that
after discharge, debtors under chapter
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7 do not possess the collateral
property. Rather, the trustee retains
possessory rights. Boodrow, there-
fore, did not truly retain possession
of his car after discharge.
Judge Shadur also disagreed with
the majority's reasoning that the
court was still able to grant relief to
Capital if it agreed with Capital's
interpretation of § 521(2). The
majority had reasoned that relief
could take the form of remanding
back to the bankruptcy court with an
order to compel Boodrow to comply
with the statute, which the majority
explained was Capital's real purpose
in filing its motion to lift the stay.
The dissent reasoned that Capital had
not filed a motion to dismiss or
compel Boodrow to comply with §
521(2). Capital's motion to lift the
stay was an end total in itself. The
only reason that Capital filed a
motion to lift the automatic stay was
to pursue further remedies under state
law. The dissent suggested that the
majority had read additional requests
for relief into Capital's motion to
create a live controversy. Since
Capital had only requested relief in
the form of lifting the stay, the
majority was essentially rewriting
Capital's motion. Therefore, when
the bankruptcy court discharged
Boodrow, no additional controversy
remained regarding Capital's motion
to lift the stay.
The dissent further dismissed
Capital's claim that the case should
be heard as an exception to the
mootness doctrine because the issue
was "capable of repetition, yet
evading review." The exception
allows certain special issues into
review even if they are moot. The
dissent explained that the exception
to the mootness doctrine was only
applicable in special circumstances:
both where the case ended too soon
so that the issue was never fully
litigated prior to becoming moot, and
where one could reasonably expect
that the injured party would probably
face the same issue again in future
proceedings. The dissent found that
such an exception did not apply
because prior judicial deliberations in
other jurisdictions showed that the
courts had fully litigated the validity
of reinstatement under § 521(2). The
dissent contended that the court
lacked jurisdiction to hear the merits
of Capital's motion to lift the
automatic stay when it became moot.
In addressing the merits of
interpreting § 521(2), the dissent
contended that Congress had listed
all of a debtor's options in § 521(2).
That section only provides three
options: surrender, redemption, or
reaffirmation. Accordingly, the
phrase, "if applicable," does not give
the debtor a fourth option to keep the
collateral and continue payments.
Furthermore, the dissent pointed out
that the 45-day time limit specified in
§ 521(2) means that a debtor cannot
continue payments for months or
years under reinstatement and remain
consistent with such a time limit. The
dissent also stated that, because
reinstatement options are not
mentioned in any other provision of
the Code, the provisions of § 521(2)
must be exclusive. The dissent also
noted that debtors would obviously
opt for reinstatement over any other
option under § 521(2) because a
debtor would not have to pay the full
balance of his loan in one lump sum
payment or negotiate with his
creditors in a reaffirmation agreement
where he would have substantially
inferior bargaining power. Though
reinstatement is desirable to debtors,
if Congress did not intend for the
debtor to have a reinstatement option,
the court may not devise a new
alternative for the debtor.
Purchaser of Ship Allowed to Recover for
Damage to Ship's Equipment
By Zachary Raimi
In Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M.
Martinac & Co., 117 S. Ct. 1783
(1997), on remand sub nom.
Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco
Seattle Inc., 122 F.3d 1250 (1997),
the United States Supreme Court
reversed the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by
holding that a plaintiff in admiralty
may recover for physical damage that
a defective portion of a ship caused
to equipment that the original owner
added to the ship before the plaintiff
purchased the vessel. The Court
found that Plaintiff could recover
under admiralty tort rules because the
added equipment was not part of the
"product itself' -- the ship -- but
rather was "other property" distinct
from the ship.
Defective Hydraulic System Caused
Fishing Vessel to Sink
In the early 1970s, J.M. Martinac
& Company ("Martinac") manufac-
tured a ship, a component of which
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